A group of philosophers suggests that a sense of mineness intrinsically contained in the phenomenal structure of all conscious experiences is a necessary condition for a subject to become aware of himself as the subject of his experiences i.e. self-awareness. On this view, consciousness necessarily entails phenomenal self-awareness. This paper argues that cases of delusions of thought insertion undermine this claim and that such a phenomenal feature plays little role in accounting for the most minimal type of self-awareness entailed by (...) phenomenal consciousness. First, I clarify the main view endorsing this claim i.e. the Self-Presentational View of Consciousness and formulate the challenge from thought insertion. After, I offer a systematic evaluation of all the strategies used by the advocates of this view to deal with this challenge. Finally, I conclude that most of these strategies are unsatisfactory for they rest in unwarranted premises, imprecisions about the agentive nature of cognitive experiences, and especially, lack of distinction between the different ways in which subjects can become aware of their own thoughts. (shrink)

Despite the diagnostic relevance of thought insertion for disorders such as schizophrenia, the debates about its aetiology are far from resolved. This paper claims that in paying exclusive attention to the perceptual and cognitive impairments leading to delusional experiences in general, current deficit approaches overlook the role that affective disturbances might play in giving rise to cases of thought insertion. In the context of psychosis, affective impairments are often characterized as a consequence of the stress and anxiety caused by delusional (...) episodes. However, here I explore some of the conceptual and empirical reasons to think that affective problems might in fact play a crucial doxastic role in the aetiology of thought insertion. Finally, I conclude by proposing a way of integrating the main insights of my analysis with the current ‘two-factor’ deficit approach to thought insertion and I explore the potential adaptive role that some delusions might have within this framework. (shrink)

RESUMEN Una atribución de agencia mental es definida como el acto de asignar el inicio o autoría de un pensamiento en primera persona a un agente específico, esto, con el fin de generar grados suficientes de control sobre nuestra vida cognitiva. Si bien esta estrategia es fundamental para distinguir diferentes tipos de estados cognitivos - tales como deliberaciones, razonamientos, juicios, entre otros -, muchos autores han indicado que también es clave para entender experiencias cognitivas psicopatológicas en psicosis. Este artículo revisa (...) la forma en que la estructura subjetiva de los delirios de inserción de pensamiento puede ser utilizada como una estrategia para evaluar los méritos argumentativos de las teorías que intentan explicar la arquitectura y naturaleza de las atribuciones de agencia mental. Luego de evaluar algunos aspectos fundamentales de las dos teorías dominantes en la literatura actual, se sugiere que, a pesar de sus importantes aportes al desarrollo de la discusión, tales enfoques no poseen los recursos explicativos suficientes para lidiar con el desafío propuesto. ABSTRACT An attribution of mental agency is defined as the act of assigning the initiation or authorship of a first personal thought to a specific agent in order to generate sufficient degrees of control over our own cognitive life. Although this strategy is crucial to distinguish different types of cognitive states - such as deliberations, reasonings, judgements, among others -, a number of authors have suggested that it is also crucial to understand psychopathological cognitive experiences in psychosis. This paper explores the way in which the subjective structure of thought insertion can be used as a strategy to evaluate the merits of theories aiming at explaining the nature and architecture of attributions of mental agency. After examining some of the most fundamental aspects of the two dominant theories in current literature, I suggest that, despite the contributions made by such theories to the discussion, none of them is able to face the challenge in a plausible way. (shrink)

Disturbances in social cognition are a core feature of schizophrenia. While most research in the field has focused on emotion perception, social knowledge, theory of mind, and attribution styles, the domain of social perception has received little specific attention. In this paper, we suggest that this issue can be explained by the lack of a precise and unitary definition of the concept, this leads to the existence of different competing uses of the concept and their conflation with other domains of (...) social cognition. Relying on resources coming from the ecological approach to psychology and the phenomenological tradition in psychiatry, we propose that the concept of Social Perception should be used to refer to low-level pre-reflective processes underlying the awareness of interpersonal interactions with and between others. Clinical data suggests that people with schizophrenia have problems perceiving social situations as opportunities for social engagement, so, in order to fulfil this explanatory need, we propose that the term should be used to capture this important—yet neglected—domain of social cognition. We conclude with the discussion of some future directions for research derived from our proposal. (shrink)

Patients suffering from delusions of thought insertion (TI) report that external agents of different nature have placed thoughts into their minds. The symptom involves distressing feelings of intromission and exposition, loss of mental privacy, diminished ego boundaries, and a – often neglected – peculiar “physicality”. A dominant approach within cognitive sciences characterizes TI as involving alterations in the experience of being the author of certain thoughts. For the advocates of this so-called Standard Approach to TI, the absence of a sense (...) of agency for certain thoughts would lead to their externalization, this explaining the general structure of the clinical reports. In this paper, I problematize the phenomenological picture of everyday thoughts that the standard approach adopts when trying to make sense of TI. I claim that the standard approach neglects two more fundamental aspects of TI, namely the multimodal nature of thinking in psychosis and the deeply social dimension of the phenomenology of delusions in schizophrenia. After this, a broader descriptive phenomenological characterization of TI is provided. Finally, I establish some connections between the characterization of TI developed here and current research in social perception and clinical practice. (shrink)

En filosofía de la mente se ha sugerido que, a diferencia de los estados puramente materiales, los estados conscientes serían aquellos de los cuales podemos decir que existe ‘un algo que es como estar en ellos’ para un sujeto, esto es, estados que poseen una fenomenología. Asumiendo una demarcación intuitiva entre estados sensoriales y estados cognitivos, durante los últimos años se ha establecido un debate en torno a la pregunta acerca del carácter fenoménico de nuestros estados cognitivos, especialmente, el de (...) nuestros pensamientos. A este asunto se le ha denominado el debate acerca de la fenomenología cognitiva. El análisis del debate parece depender del examen crítico de las formas en las que establecemos conclusiones acerca de los componentes fenoménicos de nuestra propia vida mental. El presente artículo elabora diversos problemas que se derivan del uso de dos estrategias en este contexto: reportes introspectivos y los contrastes fenoménicos. Luego de analizar la forma en que tales estrategias podrían favorecer a cierta posición dentro del debate, el artículo concluye comentando cómo algunos asuntos asociados a la fenomenología de la actividad matemática podrían iluminar el debate. (shrink)

El problema tipológico surge al intentar definir el tipo de estado mental que subyace a los reportes de pacientes delirantes. Este artículo explora dos de los enfoques más populares a este problema en la literatura actual en filosofía de la mente. El análisis concluye que el enfoque doxástico —que conceptualiza los delirios como creencias anormales— es superior en términos conceptuales, empíricos y fenomenológicos al enfoque imaginístico, que caracteriza a los delirios como un tipo de estado mental imaginario. Finalmente, se concluye (...) con algunos de los desafíos que el enfoque necesita resolver para ampliar su alcance y poder explicativo. (shrink)

After examining some of the most fundamental aspects of the general concept of ‘neuroright’ in the current discussion, this paper analyzes the concept of ‘the mental’ contained in the very first law of neurorights in the world currently under discussion in the Senate of the Republic of Chile (Bulletin 13.828-19 of the Chilean Senate). It is claimed that the lack of specificity of the target notion might not only posit difficulties for the creation of specific legal frameworks for the protection (...) of subjects from potential misuses of neurotechnologies with access to neural data, but it might also make very difficult the process of decision-taking when interpreting the law. (shrink)

Uno de los principales problemas de la filosofía de la psicopatología contemporánea consiste en definir qué tipo de estados mentales son aquellos que denominamos delirantes. A esto se le ha denominado el “problema tipológico de los delirios”. El principal objetivo de este artículo es examinar las principales alternativas filosóficas contemporáneas a este problema: el doxasticismo—de acuerdo con el cuál los deli-rios deben ser caracterizados como creencias—y al anti-doxasticismo—el cuál niega el estatuto doxásticos de los delirios y ofrece una caracterización alternativa. (...) Para examinar el debate, el artículo presentará las principales características de ambas posiciones y sus fundamentos. Después, examinaremos los principales argumentos esgrimidos contra el doxasticismo y las respuestas y contraargumentos por parte de las alternativas doxásticas. Finalmente, expondremos algunas cuestiones conceptua-les y desafíos abiertos relacionados con el debate y que, a nuestro juicio, deberían de marcar la hoja de ruta de los filósofos de la mente interesados en los delirios en los próximos años. (shrink)

An attribution of mental agency is defined as the act of assigning the initiation or authorship of a first personal phenomenal thought to a specific agent. This type of attribution is fundamental for the production of the belief that human beings are rational agents not only in behavioral terms, but also, in a cognitive manner. The top-down approach –one of the dominant theories in current literature– suggests that attributions of mental agency arise as retrospective rational explanations for the occurrence of (...) phenomenal thoughts. Thus, the agency of a thought would not be contained in its most fundamental phenomenal structure, rather, it would be an imposed category. After introducing the most fundamental elements of the debate, this paper evaluates the top-down model in order to identify its argumentative strengths and weaknesses. It is concluded that, although this model possesses a number of merits, it cannot deal in a plausible way with some fundamental conceptual challenges. (shrink)

En el campo de la psicología ecológica, la noción de affordance refiere a la percepción de oportunidades para la acción en los objetos del entorno. Problemáticamente, la falta de unidad conceptual parece dominar la caracterización del fenómeno haciendo que su significado varíe drásticamente dependiendo del autor que hace uso de ella. Este artículo ofrece una exégesis sistemática al trabajo original de J.J. Gibson enfocándose en la pregunta sobre qué son las affordances y cuáles son sus componentes fundamentales. Finalmente, se propone (...) una clasificación que permitirá categorizar diversas alternativas contemporáneas del concepto según la forma en la cual entienden la relación entre tales componentes. (shrink)

ResumenEl enfoque posracionalista surge desde la crítica constructivista a la forma en que el cognitivismo tradicional conceptualiza la relación entre sujeto y realidad. Tomando como principal unidad de análisis el estudio de la identidad personal como fenómeno bio-psicológico, el modelo de Vittorio Guidano se ha convertido en la formulación más popular de este enfoque. Lamentablemente, la abrupta partida de su fundador parece haber dejado una serie de cuestiones conceptuales abiertas a la base del modelo. El presente artículo identifica los aspectos (...) fundamentales de la epistemología posracionalista de Guidano y luego de explorar su obra tardía, propone que es posible identificar dos momentos fundamentales en el enfoque: (i) Un primer momento (que denominamos Guidano 1 y que concentra la mayoría de la literatura en el tema) que es la expresión de una marcada influencia constructivista que implica la idea de que el principio organizador del funcionamiento de los sistemas humanos es la sobrevivencia. (ii) Un segundo momento (que llamamos Guidano 2 y que no ha sido exhaustivamente explorado en la literatura actual) que puede ser identificado como el producto de un giro hacia la filosofía fenomenológico-existencial. Acá, la identidad de un organismo no solo está orientada a la sobrevivencia, sino que, sobre todo, al sentido de la existencia misma. Se concluye clarificando el tipo de fenomenología que guiaría la práctica clínica de Guidano 2.Palabras clave: cognitivismo; constructivismo; fenomenología; posracionalismo. (shrink)

The following paper presents and discuses the epistemological premises of one of the relativistic expressions of the so-called constructivism i.e. the social constructionism. Firstly, we trace constructivism’s theoretical origins and later, we distinguish the main ideas of Kenneth Gergen’s social constructionist proposal. The analysis is done in the following way: (a) we analyse the epistemological premises and the philosophical problems arising from them, and (b) we analyse the problematic impact these premises have in the praxis of social sciences. Finally, we (...) conclude that the exclusion of clear philosophical distinctions inside social constructionism undermines social constructionism’s plausibility. El siguiente artículo presenta y discute los postulados epistemológicos de una de las expresiones relativistas del denominado constructivismo i.e. el construccionismo social. En primer momento, se rastrean los orígenes teóricos del constructivismo y, posteriormente, se distinguen los principales postulados del construccionismo social de Kenneth Gergen. El análisis se realiza del siguiente modo: (a) Se analizan los supuestos epistemológicos y los problemas filosóficos derivados de éstos, y (b) Se analizan las consecuencias que los postulados construccionistas tienen en la praxis que llevan a cabo las ciencias sociales. Finalmente, se concluye que la exclusión de distinciones filosóficas claras por parte del construccionismo social le resta plausibilidad al enfoque. (shrink)

El carácter analítico de Meditationes implica que, por una parte, ninguna verdad puede ser interpretada sin referencia al lugar concreto que ocupa en el orden de razones y, por otra, que no existen en Meditationes ficciones que permanezcan advertidamente como tales. Sin embargo, la presencia de algunas pasiones no ha sido justificada, lo que pone en cuestión el carácter analítico de la obra. Proponemos que tales pasiones son efecto de juicios implícitos. Para poner a prueba nuestra hipótesis, hemos elegido un (...) enigmático párrafo que hemos denominado el “texto de la adoración.”. (shrink)

RESUMEN El carácter analítico de Meditationes implica que, por una parte, ninguna verdad puede ser interpretada sin referencia al lugar concreto que ocupa en el orden de razones y, por otra, que no existen en Meditationes ficciones que permanezcan inadvertidamente como tales. Sin embargo, la presencia de algunas pasiones no ha sido justificada, lo que pone en cuestión el carácter analítico de la obra. Proponemos que tales pasiones son efecto de juicios implícitos. Para poner a prueba nuestra hipótesis, hemos elegido (...) un enigmático párrafo que hemos denominado el "texto de la adoración." ABSTRACT The analytical character of Meditationes de Prima Philosophia implies that: a) no truth can be correctly interpreted without reference to the concrete place it occupies in the order of reasons of the text ; b) there are no fictions in Meditationes that remain inadvertently as such. However, the presence of some passions has not been adequately explained, putting into question the truly analytical character of the work. We propose that these passions are effects of true but implicit judgments. To test our hypothesis, we have chosen an enigmatic paragraph called the "text of the adoration.". (shrink)

Uno de los principales problemas de la filosofía de la psicopatología contemporánea consiste en definir qué tipo de estados mentales son aquellos que denominamos delirantes. A esto se le ha denominado el “problema tipológico de los delirios”. El principal objetivo de este artículo es examinar las principales alternativas filosóficas contemporáneas a este problema: el doxasticismo—de acuerdo con el cuál los delirios deben ser caracterizados como creencias—y al anti-doxasticismo—el cuál niega el estatuto doxásticos de los delirios y ofrece una caracterización alternativa. (...) Para examinar el debate, el artículo presentará las principales características de ambas posiciones y sus fundamentos. Después, examinaremos los principales argumentos esgrimidos contra el doxasticismo y las respuestas y contraargumentos por parte de las alternativas doxásticas. Finalmente, expondremos algunas cuestiones conceptuales y desafíos abiertos relacionados con el debate y que, a nuestro juicio, deberían de marcar la hoja de ruta de los filósofos de la mente interesados en los delirios en los próximos años. (shrink)

Positive Psychology has turned its attention to the study of emotions in a scientific and rigorous way. Particularly, to how emotions influence people’s health, performance, or their overall life satisfaction. Within this trend, Flow theory has established a theoretical framework that helps to promote the Flow experience. Flow state, or optimal experience, is a mental state of high concentration and enjoyment that, due to its characteristics, has been considered desirable for the development of the performing activity of performing musicians. Musicians (...) are a population prone to health problems, both psychological and physical, owing to different stressors of their training and professional activity. One of the most common problems is Musical Performance Anxiety. In this investigation, an electronic intervention program was carried out for the development of psychological self-regulation skills whose main objective was to trigger the Flow response in performing musicians and the coping mechanism for Musical Performance Anxiety. A quasi-experimental design was used with a control group in which pre- and post-measures of Flow State, Musical Performance Anxiety and, also, Social Skills were taken. Sixty-two performing musicians from different music colleges in Spain participated in the program. Results indicated that the intervention significantly improved Flow State, and Sense of Control, and decreased Music Performance Anxiety, and self-consciousness of the participants in the EG but not CG. The changes in the EG after the program showed the inverse relationship between Flow and Anxiety. Two important theoretical factors of both variables, such as worry and the feeling of lack of control, could be involved. The results are under discussion and future lines of research are proposed. (shrink)

The Purpose in Life Test is a measure of purpose in life widely used in many cultures and countries; however, cross-cultural assessments are scarce. The present study aimed to evaluate the cross-cultural measurement invariance of the PIL in the general population of seven Latin American countries. A total of 4306 people participated, selected by non-probabilistic convenience sampling, where Uruguay has the highest mean age ; while Ecuador has the lowest mean age. Furthermore, in each country, there is a higher proportion (...) of women than men. Using Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis, the factorial structure does not show evidence of invariance among the included countries. However, based on the Multi-Group Factor Analysis Alignment, there is evidence that a three-dimensional structure of the PIL is the same in the participating countries. Results based on item response theory indicate that most PIL items can significantly differentiate responses according to the level of life purpose. In addition, people with low life purpose will tend to choose the lower response alternatives on the PIL; while people with higher life purpose will choose higher response alternatives. The findings indicate that the PIL has the potential to increase knowledge about how people conceive and experience their purpose in life in different countries. (shrink)

Praxis Filosófica Nueva serie, No. 41, julio-diciembre 2015: 217 - 232 ISSN: 0120-4688EL PRÍNCIPE DE MAQUIAVELO:DESAFÍOS, LEGADOS Y SIGNIFICADOSJorge Andrés López Rivera, CompiladorCali, Pontificia Universidad Javerianay Universidad del Valle, 2014, 286 páginas.

This article examines four characters from the novel Hombres by Eugenio González in order to reveal the identities of those people who were an inspiration for the narrator to shape the fiction in novel. Since Hombres is placed temporarily in Carlos Ibáñez’s dictatorship, the narrator decides to hide the poet Gómez Rojas, the union leader Luis Triviño, Dr. Juan Gandulfo and the lawyer Carlos Vicuña between the pages of the book. This narrative procedure keeps these people’s identities safe; considering that, (...) making these names and activities evident would have represented a problem for the state security apparatus. (shrink)

Knowledge and true relations represent the principal task of Theory of Knowledge. This paper argues about various solutions to the justification of knowledge, given by William James, Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas. For classic Pragmatism Knowledge and Truth converge with the idea of a guideline, direction and orientation with an effective value for men. The Newpragmatism represented by Rorty tries out the way of the widest possible widening of justification contexts, taking as last referent the features of a western liberal (...) culture. Habermas pleads for a strong idealization in his discussion with Rorty up to the ideal speech situation. (shrink)

Knowledge and true relations represent the principal task of Theory of Knowledge. This paper argues about various solutions to the justification of knowledge, given by William James, Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas. For classic Pragmatism Knowledge and Truth converge with the idea of a guideline, direction and orientation with an effective value for men. The Newpragmatism represented by Rorty tries out the way of the widest possible widening of justification contexts, taking as last referent the features of a western liberal (...) culture. Habermas pleads for a strong idealization in his discussion with Rorty up to the ideal speech situation. (shrink)

In this paper a comparison of some central elements of the philosophies of H.Bergson and J. Ortega and Gasset is tried. After analyzing their coincidences and divergences we will establish their common ownership to a line of development of the european metaphysics that starts up from the critic to the kantismo.

Este trabajo tiene como objeto poner de manifiesto las claves suarecianas de la teoría de la libertad, de acuerdo con las cuales la libertad es una potencia activa de la voluntad que, si bien se muestra indiferente en el acto de elección, sin embargo, se trata de una indiferencia activa, en la medida en que el ser humano ejerce una específica causalidad por libertad que tiene su fundamento metafísico en la teoría del acto virtual. El hombre es libre porque el (...) concurso divino no determina el acto de la voluntad libre, sino que deja al libre arbitrio humano la decisión de actuar o no actuar, de hacer una cosa o su opuesta. (shrink)